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Motivation: Why Cyber Resilience? 
 
Society is increasingly reliant upon complex and interconnected cyber systems to conduct daily 
life activities. From personal finance to managing defense capabilities to controlling a vast web 
of aircraft traffic, digitized information systems and software packages have become integrated 
at virtually all levels of individual and collective activity. While such integration has been met 
with immense increases in efficiency of service delivery, it has also been subject to a diverse 
body of threats from nefarious hackers, groups, and even state government bodies. Such cyber 
threats have shifted over time to affect various cyber functionalities, such as with Direct Denial 
of Service (DDoS), data theft, changes to data code, infection via computer virus, and many 
others. 
Attack targets have become equally diverse, ranging from individuals to international 
companies and national government agencies. At the individual level, thousands of personal 
data records including credit card information and government identification is stolen on a daily 
basis – disrupting the lives of many persons and generating billions of dollars in fraud or other 
losses. At the corporate level, hacking attempts targeted at the Sony Corporation, Equifax, and 
other similarly sized organizations demonstrate the potential for hackers to gain entry to 
sensitive information stored in company databases, and potentially impact the security of 
millions of users. Lastly, state-based cyber threats arise from individual hackers and other large 
states alike, such as with daily intrusion attempts that occur within the Department of Defense. 
While many cyber threats are thwarted, many are able to exact lasting and widespread damage 
in terms of security, financial losses, social disorder, and other concerns. In warfare, cyber 
threats may soon become one of the main factors that decide whether a war is won or lost 
(Kott et al 2015).  
Whereas traditional risk assessment comprises a calculation of product of threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences for hazards and their subsequent exposures, risk assessment 
becomes limited in the cybersecurity field as approaches are needed to address threats and 
vulnerabilities that become integrated within a wide variety of interdependent computing 
systems and accompanying architecture (DiMase et al. 2015; Ganin et al. 2017). For highly 
complex and interconnected systems, it becomes prohibitively difficult to conduct a risk 
assessment that adequately accounts for the potential cascading effects that could occur 
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through an outage or loss spilling over into other systems. Given the rapid evolution of threats 
to cyber systems, new management approaches are needed that address risk across all 
interdependent domains (i.e., physical, information, cognitive, and social) of cyber systems 
(Linkov et al. 2013a, b).  
Further, the unpredictability, extreme uncertainty, and rapid evolution of potential 
cyber threats leaves risk assessment efforts all the more unable to adequately address 
cybersecurity concerns for critical infrastructural systems. For this reason, the traditional 
approach of hardening of cyber systems against identified threats has proven to be impossible. 
The only true defense that cybersecurity professionals could take to harden systems from the 
multitude of potential cyber threats would include the disallowance of cyber systems from 
accessing the internet. Therefore, in the same way that biological systems develop immunity as 
a way to respond to infections and other attacks, so too must cyber systems adapt to ever-
changing threats that continue to attack vital system functions, and to bounce back from the 
effects of the attacks (Linkov et al. 2014). 
For these reasons, cyber resilience refers to the ability of the system to prepare, absorb, 
recover and adapt to adverse effects, especially those associated with cyber-attacks. (We will 
discuss the exact definitions later.) Here, depending of the context, we use the term cyber 
resilience to refer mainly to the resilience property of a system or network; sometimes we also 
use the term as referring to the features or components of the system that enable cyber 
resilience.   
 
Resilience and Systems 
 
Cyber resilience should be considered in the context of complex systems that comprise 
not only physical and information but also cognitive and social domains (Smith, 2005).  Cyber 
Resilience ensures that system recovery occurs by considering interconnected hardware, 
software and sensing components of cyber infrastructure (Fig 1).  It is thus constitute a bridge 
between sustaining operations of the system while ensuring mission execution.  
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Figure 1. The cyber resilience domains comprise sensing, hardware, and software components 
which collectively contribute to sustaining system operations. .  
.  
Resilience has roots in many disciplines and integrates ecological, social, psychological, 
organizational, and engineering perspectives and definitions. Resilience engineering, for 
example, has been defined as “the ability of systems to anticipate and adapt to the potential for 
surprise and failure,” and has been associated with a shift in safety paradigm acknowledging 
that system coping is important when prevention is impossible (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 
2006). Ecological resilience, on the other hand, refers to the ability of the system to absorb and 
withstand shocks, with an emphasis on persistence (Holling, 1996). Resilience is used as a 
metaphor to describe how systems react to stressors, and to bridge the gap in understandings 
between fields, resilience needs to be discussed less abstractly, separating the metaphor from 
the science. Across the many diverse lines of inquiry, there are weak linkages between concepts 
and methods for resilience.  Useful ideas and results accumulate and partially overlap but it is 
often difficult to find the common areas.  In addition, the different technical languages hamper 
communication of ideas about resilience across the different contributing disciplines and 
application problems.   
Despite multi-disciplinary nature of resilience and multiple definition, there are common 
themes and resilience features across these multiple disciplines (Connolly et al (2017).  
Resilience defined by the National Academies of Science (NAS) as “the ability to prepare and 
plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events” is emerging as 
one of the most widely used by various organizations and governance agencies (Larkin et al., 
2015).  The common resilience features include critical functions (services), thresholds, cross-
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scale (both space and time) interactions, and memory and adaptive management. The concept 
of critical functionality is important to understanding and planning for resilience to some shock 
or disturbance. Thresholds play a role in whether a system is able to absorb a shock, and 
whether recovery time or alternative stable states are most salient. Recovery time is essential in 
assessing system resilience after a disturbance where a threshold is not exceeded. Finally, the 
concepts of memory describes the degree of self-organization in the system, and adaptive 
management provides an approach to managing and learning about a system’s resilience 
opportunities and limits, in a safe-to-fail manner. Connelly et al., 2017 related these features to 
the National Academy of Sciences definition of resilience (Table 1), including the temporal 
phases of the NAS definition to emphasizing the importance of time in all conceptualizations of 
resilience.  
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Table 1. Resilience features common to socio-ecology, psychology, organizations, and 
engineering and infrastructure, which are related to the temporal phases from the National 
Academy of Sciences definition of resilience (from Connelly et al., 2017, with permission). 
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  Description by Application Domain 
NAS 
phase of 
resilience 
Resilience 
Feature 
Socio-
Ecological 
Psychological Organizational Engineering 
& 
Infrastructur
e 
Plan Critical 
Functions 
(Services) 
A system function identified by stakeholders as an important 
dimension by which to assess system performance 
Ecosystem 
services 
provided to 
society 
Human 
psychological 
well-being 
Goods and 
services 
provided to 
society 
Services 
provided by 
physical and 
technical 
engineered 
systems  
Absorb Thresholds Intrinsic tolerance to stress or changes in conditions where 
exceeding a threshold perpetuates a regime shift 
Used to 
identify 
natural 
breaks in 
scale 
Based on 
sense of 
community 
and personal 
attributes 
Linked to 
organizational 
adaptive 
capacity and 
to brittleness 
when close to 
threshold 
Based on 
sensitivity of 
system 
functioning 
to changes in 
input 
variables 
Recover Time (and Scale) Duration of degraded system performance 
Emphasis on 
dynamics 
over time 
Emphasis on 
time of 
disruption 
(i.e., 
development
al stage: 
childhood vs 
adulthood) 
Emphasis on 
time until 
recovery 
Emphasis on 
time until 
recovery 
Adapt Memory/Adapti
ve Management 
Change in management approach or other responses in 
anticipation of or enabled by learning from previous 
disruptions, events, or experiences 
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Ecological 
memory 
guides how 
ecosystem 
reorganizes 
after a 
disruption, 
which is 
maintained if 
the system 
has high 
modularity 
Human and 
social 
memory, can 
enhance 
(through 
learning) or 
diminish 
(e.g., post-
traumatic 
stress) 
psychological 
resilience 
Corporate 
memory of 
challenges 
posed to the 
organization 
and 
management 
that enable 
modification 
and building 
of 
responsivenes
s to events  
Re-designing 
of 
engineering 
systems 
designs 
based on 
past and 
potential 
future 
stressors 
 
 
 
Resilience and Related Properties of Systems 
 
Similarly to other fields, cyber resiliency refers to the system’s ability to recover or regenerate 
its performance after a cyber attacks produces a degradation of its performance. For now, until 
we delve further into metrics of cyber resilience, we can say the following: assuming two 
equally performing systems  A and B subjected to an impact (resulting from a cyber-attack) that 
left both systems with an equal performance degradation, the resiliency of system A is greater 
if after a given period T it recovers to a higher level of performance than that of system B.  
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Resilience is often confused or conflated with several other related but different concepts. These 
include risk, robustness, and security. Oxford dictionary clearly defined these concepts.  Risk is 
“a situation involving exposure to danger [threat].” If risk is managed appropriately, system 
reaches state of security (i.e. “the state of being free from danger or threat”)  or robustness ( i.e 
“the ability to withstand or overcome adverse conditions or rigorous testing).  Security, 
robustness and risks are connected, they are focused on preventing system from degrading and 
keeping functionality within acceptable level before and after the adverse event.  Resilience is a 
very different concept.  Oxford defines it as “the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties.”  
Resilience assessment thus starts with the assumption that system is affected, functionality is 
impaired and is focused on evaluation of recovery speed.   
The literature on cyber risk (including here what some call “IT risk”) most commonly defines cyber 
risk in terms that combine likelihood of an undesirable event, and a measure of the impact of the 
event.  Although several approaches to risk assessment exist, the methods adopted by US 
regulatory agencies are largely based around the risk = threat x vulnerability x consequence 
model. For example, NIST's description from NIST Publication SP 800-30 (NIST) states: "Risk is a 
function of the likelihood of a given threat-source's exercising a particular potential vulnerability, 
and the resulting impact of that adverse event on the organization. To determine the likelihood 
of a future adverse event, threats to an IT system must be analyzed in conjunction with the 
potential vulnerabilities and the controls in place for the IT system." ISO’s definition of IT risk is 
similar: the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets 
and thereby cause harm to the organization. It is measured in terms of a combination of the 
probability of occurrence of an event and its consequence (ISO/IEC 2008). 
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The key components of  cyber risk are relatively well understood. The likelihood of a successful 
cyber attack can be empirically measured and estimated apriori with a degree of accuracy from 
known characteristics of a system or network (Leslie et al 2017), (Gil et al 2014). The cyber 
impact on a system is a topic in which assessment methods are being developed (Kott et al 
2017). Since cyber threats are difficult to quantify, current efforts shift from quantifying risk in 
specific units (like probability of failure) towards risk-based decision making using multi-criteria 
decision analysis (Ganin et al., 2017). Unlike the concept of resilience, the concept of risk does 
not answer the questions of how well the system is able to absorb a cyber attack, or how 
quickly and how completely the system is able to recover from a cyber attack. Whenever risks 
are identified and actions taken to reduce risk, there still remains residual risk. As such, 
resilience assessment and management is, in part, an effort to address that remaining known, 
but unmitigated, risk as well as enhance the overall ability of the system to respond to 
unknown or emerging threats. 
 
Robustness is another concept often confused with resilience. Robustness is closely related to 
risk.  Robustness denotes the degree to which a system is able to withstand an unexpected 
internal or external threats or change without degradation in system’s performance. To put it 
differently, assuming two systems – A and B—of equal performance, the robustness of system 
A is greater than that of system B if  the same unexpected impact on both systems leaves 
system A with greater performance than system B. We stress the word unexpected because the 
concept of robustness focuses specifically on performance not only under ordinary, anticipated 
conditions (which a well-designed system should be prepared to withstand) but also under 
unusual conditions that stress its designers' assumptions. For example, in IEEE Standard 
610.12.1990, “Robustness is defined as the degree to which a system operates correctly in the 
presence of exceptional inputs or stressful environmental conditions.” Similarly, “robust control 
refers to the control of unknown plants with unknown dynamics subject to unknown 
disturbances” (Chandrasekharan 1996). Note that the length of recovery typically depends on 
the extent of damage. There may also be a point beyond which recovery is impossible. Hence, 
there is a relation between robustness (which determines how much damage is incurred in 
response to an unexpected disturbance) and resiliency (which determines how quickly the 
system can recover from such damage). In particular, a system that lacks robustness will often 
fail beyond recovery, hence offering little resiliency. Both robustness and resiliency, therefore, 
must be understood together. 
 
 
 
Making Business Case for Cyber Resilience 
 
Traditional risk assessment is appealing for cyber risk governance due to the quantitative nature 
and the single risk value that is output. These characteristics make risk thresholds easy to 
formalize in policy documents and to regulate in a consistent manner at the federal level. 
However, quantitative risk assessment typically involves quantification of the likelihood of an 
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event’s occurrence and of the vulnerability to the event. Emerging cyber realities and 
technologies are presenting new threats with uncertain intensity and frequency and the 
vulnerabilities and consequences in terms of the extent of casualties, economic losses, time 
delays, or other damages are not yet fully understood or modeled. As a result, risk calculations 
become more uncertain and generate costly solutions since multiple, often hypothetical, threat 
scenarios could point to many vulnerabilities and catastrophic system failures that are 
unaffordable to mitigate, absorb, or recover. Furthermore, users and other stakeholders may 
have preferences for accepting some loss in performance of one part of the system over any 
degradation in another part (Bostick, Holzer, and Sarkani 2017). One outcome can be significant 
funding spent in ways that do not align with stakeholder values, resulting in dissatisfaction with 
performance, despite the expense, or even litigation that interferes with the risk reduction 
efforts.  
 
A key risk management strategy is to identify critical components of a system that are vulnerable 
to failure and subsequently, to harden them. This approach can be appropriate for many isolated 
cyber systems, but when the nature of the threat is unknown, as discussed above, it is difficult to 
identify all of the critical components and it becomes increasing expensive to act conservatively 
to harden or protect all parts of the system against all types of threats (Figure 1).   The result has 
been stagnation in investment. As risk mitigation plans become more expensive and are delayed 
while funding is sought, infrastructure and societal systems are left largely unprepared for 
emerging and uncertain threats (Meyer 2011). Furthermore, there are fewer and fewer isolated 
systems in our world and the degree of interdependency and interconnectedness can be difficult 
to characterize and quantify.  
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual diagram of the cost of buying-down risk in cyber systems. 
 
In exchange for accepting the current levels of risk rather than demanding greater preventative 
and protective measures, funding can be re-allocated towards resilience enhancement efforts. 
For systems that have already completed cost-effective risk reduction measures, Figure 3 shows 
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the funding that can be re-allocated toward resilience by accepting risk level (a) over risk level 
(b). In parallel to these public changes, the academic community should be called on to develop 
decision models that identify the optimal investment in risk reduction versus resilience and 
recovery improvement. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Existential threat and mega-cost avoided when resources are re-allocated to 
resilience—e.g., accepting risk level (a) instead of risk level (b). 
 
Assessment of Cyber Resilience 
 
Myriad tools and methods marketed as resilience assessments now exist, but take very different 
formats (Linkov and Florin, 2016; Nordgren, Stults and Meerow, 2016; Arnott, Moser, and 
Goodrich, 2016). Some are as simple as a checklist, others are geo-spatial visualizations of 
quantifiable metrics, while still others are network modeling methods but with no generalized 
form, they are custom built for each application. The outputs of these tools are similarly varied, 
including maps, scores, and process time graphs. Developers of the tools span a wide range of 
entities including academic, private (e.g., consulting), program sponsors (e.g., foundations and 
agencies), boundary organizations that bridge across research, policy, and practitioner realms, 
and potentials users themselves. Potential users include state and city managers, industry 
process administrators, and utility operators, many lacking the expertise to choose among the 
rapidly accumulating products in this emerging field.  
Figure 2 shows two primary approaches currently described in the literature to address 
resilience, including metric-based and model-based approaches. Metric-based approaches use 
measures of individual properties of system components or functions to assess overall system 
performance while  model-based approaches use system configuration modeling and scenario 
analysis to predict system evolution. In general, metrics are defined as measurable properties 
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of the system that quantify the degree to which the objectives of the system are achieved. 
Metrics provide vital information pertaining to a given system, and are generally acquired by 
way of analyzing relevant attributes of that system. Some researchers and practitioners make a 
distinction between a measure and a metric, whereas others may refer to metrics as 
performance measures (Collier et al 2016). Resilience metrics are discussed in detail in (Linkov 
et al 2013b), and two chapters of this book are dedicated to exploring alternative approaches 
to defining cyber resilience metrics. 
Despite differing levels of mathematical complexity, the scientific challenges are in addressing 
system-level processes and tailoring methodologies to specific needs. A number of efforts have 
been focused on developing metrics that are applicable to a variety of systems, including social, 
ecological and technical (Eisenberg et al. 2014). The current lack of universally applicable 
resilience metrics as well as inability to formalize value systems relevant to the problems at hand 
have been barriers to wide implementation of metric-based methodologies.  Advances in 
decision analysis and social and economic valuation of benefits offer ways to address these 
challenges, with methods to assess the impact of trading off resilience attributes (e.g., flexibility, 
redundancy) with values currently considered in the decision-making process (e.g., cost, 
environmental impact, risk reduction) for diverse investment alternatives. Further research on 
this topic can greatly benefit both management and investment decisions for system resilience. 
 
Model-based approaches focus on a representation of the real world and a definition of resilience 
using mathematical or physical concepts.  Modeling requires knowledge of the critical functions 
of a system, mission, the temporal patterns of a systems, thresholds, and system memory and 
adaptation. Process models require a detailed understanding of the physical approaches within 
a system to simulate event impacts and system recovery and are difficult to construct and are 
information consuming. Statistical approaches alternatively require a lot of data on system 
performance. Bayesian models combine features of process and statistical models.  Network 
models require a presentation of the system as interconnected networks whose structure is 
dependent on the function of the system. Alternatively, the game theoretical/agent-based 
approach focuses on the model performance of the system based on a limited set of rules defined 
by modelers. Using these approaches, resilience can be defined but the utility of many advanced 
models is limited because of the data intensive requirements. Network science is emerging as an 
important tool to allow quantitative framing for the future of resilience as a scientific discipline.  
In network science, the system is represented as an interconnected network of links and nodes 
that exhibit behavior in space and time. These methods have been demonstrated; though only 
for limited case studies where network recovery was explicitly modeled (Ganin et al. 2016; Gao, 
Barzel, and Barábasi 2016; Cohen et al. 2000). The challenge is to frame resilience as 
characteristic of several major network properties that would provide a universal foundation to 
the field with cross-domain applications, similar to the threat-vulnerability-consequence 
framework used in the field of risk analysis. The four parameters of resilience (critical function, 
thresholds, time, and memory) will be the basis of identifying and describing the relevant 
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network properties. This shift in thinking and assessment tools is needed to encourage 
adaptability and flexibility in addition to adequately assessing the tradeoffs between redundancy 
and efficiency that characterize a useful resilience assessment. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.Metric-based and model-based approaches for Resilience Assessment. Multiple tools 
have been developed to address resilience in systems in both methodological groups. 
 
 
Figure 3. Overview of tiered approach to resilience assessment 
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Linkov et al (2018) proposed combining all multiple tools for resilience assessment in a tired 
framework (Figure 1). The goal of each tier is to describe the performance and relationship of 
critical systems in order to identify management options that enhance performance in parallel 
with activities that reduce risk. The methods of Tier I quickly and inexpensively identify the 
broad functions that a system provides to human society or the environment and prioritize the 
performance of the critical functions both during and in the time following a disruptive event. 
Analytically, this framing and characterization analysis makes use of existing data, expert 
judgment, and conceptual models. The methods of Tier II describe the general organization and 
relationships of the system in a simple form such as a process model or critical path model. 
Identifying sequential and parallel events in a disturbance can reveal feedback processes and 
dependencies that are the root of cascading system failures. The methods of Tier III build a 
detailed model of important functions and related sub-systems where each process and each 
component of the system is parameterized. The process can be halted at any tier when enough 
information has been synthesized such that actionable system investments or projects to 
improve system resilience, given available resources, have been identified by the decision 
makers. 
 
Approaches to Improving Cyber Resilience 
 
Resilience of a system, a network or an organization is influenced by a number of factors, in a 
complex and often contradictory manner. In this section, we consider some of these factors, 
and how they can be managed or exploited in order to enhance the resilience. In addition to 
this section, further in this book, the chapter by Keys et al discusses general practices, and the 
chapter by Bodeau and Graubart describes a set of frameworks, analytic methods, and 
technologies that can be used to improve system and mission cyber resilience. 
Manage Complexity: Resilience of a system or network depends greatly on complexity of links 
within the system (Kott and Abdelzaher 2014).  In his pioneering work, Perrow (1984) explains 
that catastrophic failures of systems emerge from high complexity of links which lead to 
interactions that the system’s designer cannot anticipate and guard against. System’s resiliency 
precautions can be defeated by hidden paths, incomprehensible to the designer because the 
links are so numerous, heterogeneous, and often implicit.  
This issue is particularly important in multi-genre networks, which are networks that combine 
several distinct genres – networks of physical resources, communication networks, information 
networks, and social and cognitive networks. When we consider an entire multi-genre 
network—and not merely one of the heterogeneous, single-genre sub-networks that comprise 
the whole – we see far more complexity of the paths connecting the network’s elements.  
Of particular importance are those paths within the system that are not recognized or 
comprehended by the designer. Indeed, the designer can usually devise a mechanism to 
prevent a propagation of failure through the links that are obvious. Many, however are not 
obvious, either because there are simply too many paths to consider – and the numbers rapidly 
increase once we realize that the paths between elements of a communication system, for 
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example, may also pass through a social or an information network—or because the links are 
implicit and subtle. Subtle feedback links may lead to a failure in organizational decision making 
(Kott 2006).  
To enhance resilience, in some cases, the designer of the system can use greater complexity of 
connections between two elements of the systems by increasing redundancy of its functions. 
Also, as the number and heterogeneity of links grow, they offer the agents (or other active 
mechanisms) within the network more opportunities to regenerate the network’s performance. 
These agent may be able to use additional links to more elements in order to reconnect the 
network, to find replacement resources, and ultimately to restore its functions.  
On the other hand, greater complexity of the network may also reduce the resiliency of the 
network. For example, active agents may be more likely to be confused by the complexity of 
the network, or to be defeated in their restoration work by un-anticipated side effects induced 
by hidden paths within the network.  The increase in complexity may also lead to lower 
resilience by increasing—and hiding from the designer—the number of ways in which one 
failed component may cause the failure of another. Therefore, in most cases greater complexity 
should be avoided when possible, unless it directly supports resilience functions. In this book, 
the chapter by Evans and Horsthemke explains the role of dependencies in complex systems 
and how to analyze and characterize the impact of dependencies; in another chapter they 
provide an example of analysis of a large-scale, highly complex web of systems called regional 
critical infrastructure. The chapter by Bodeau and Graubart describe the techniques of 
segmentation and isolation that can be used to manage the complexity in order to enhance 
resilience.  
Chose Topology: Quite apart from complexity, the choice of appropriate topology of the system 
or network can improve resilience. Much prior research addressed the fundamental 
vulnerabilities of different networks as a function of their topological properties. Of particular 
interest has been the classification of properties of networks according to their node degree 
distribution. While some networks (such as wireless and mesh networks) are fairly 
homogeneous and follow an exponential node degree distribution, others, called scale-free 
networks (such as the Web or the power-grid), offer significant skew in node degrees, 
described by a power-law. It is well known that scale-free graphs are much more robust to 
random node failures (errors) than graphs with an exponential degree distribution, but that 
these scale-free graphs are increasingly more vulnerable to targeted attacks (namely, removal 
of high-degree nodes).  In this book, the chapter by Moore and Cho explores the role of 
topology and methods to analyze the influence of topology on resilience; and the chapter by 
Kotenko et al presents topology-based methods in analysis of cyber attack propagation and the 
impact on resilience. 
Add Resources: additional resources in a network can help improve resiliency. For example, 
adding capacity to nodes in a power generation and distribution network may reduce likelihood 
of cascading failures and speed up the service restoration. Adding local storage and influencing 
the distribution of nodes of different functions in a network also leads to improved resilience at 
the expense of additional resources. Resiliency may be improved by adding multiple functional 
capacities to each node (usually implying the need for additional resources), by processing 
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more input sources (requiring more resources for acquisition of inputs and for processing), or 
by combination of multiple parallel processing mechanisms. Yet the same measures tend to 
increase complexity and might cause greater difficulties in restoring the network's capability if 
degraded by an unexpected -- and probably harder to understand--failure. 
Providing redundant resources can help both to absorb and to restore the system. Redundancy, 
however, should be used with caution. If the designer adds identical redundant software or 
hardware, the same malware would be able to compromise multiple redundant resources. If 
diversity is introduced, and the redundant resources are significantly different, the complexity 
grows with its potential negative impact on resilience. In this book, the chapter by Musman 
offers an example of estimating mission resilience in comparing two options of adding 
resources: (a) adding a replicate server or (2) adding a fast recovery resource. The chapter by 
Bodeau and Graubart discusses how technologies and processes for contingency planning and 
COOP, including Diversity and Redundancy, support resilience. The chapter by Curado et al 
describes the Fog Services concept in which functions are widely distributed over large number 
of resources. 
Design for Reversibility: Components of the system should be designed in a manner that allows 
them to revert to a safe mode when failed or compromised. This means several things: (1) the 
component in the failed mode should not cause any further harm to itself or other components 
of system or environment; (2) it should be possible to reverse the state of the component in the 
process of recovering the system. This is because some failures, such as physical breakage and 
human losses are often irreversible or expensive to remedy (e.g., once there is a reactor 
meltdown, it is hard to “roll back”). This characteristic is unlike purely logical systems (e.g., 
databases), where roll-back from failure is more feasible and cheaper.  
Note however, that conventional fail-safe design practice could be incompatible with need for 
the system to absorb the failure, and therefore may reduce resilience. For example, the 
operator of a system notices that a computer is compromised by a malware. A reasonable fail-
safe action might be to disconnect the computer. However, this might be detrimental to the 
overall resilience of the system if the computer is needed to support other components that 
execute damage absorbing actions.  
Control Propagation: To enhance the system’s ability to absorb the impact of a cyber 
compromise, the designer should guard against cascaded failures. Such failures are non-
independent in that one triggers another. A network that is prone to large “domino effects” will 
likely sustain severe damage in response to even modest disturbances, which significantly limits 
the scope within which efficient absorption and recovery (and hence resilient operation) 
remains possible.  Therefore, the dependencies or links between nodes should designed, 
whenever possible, in a way that minimizes the likelihood that a failure propagates from easily 
from one node to another. Ideally, links should both passively and actively filter out the 
propagation of failure. One possible form of such filtering is buffering, discussed next in this 
section. Further in this book, the chapter by Moore and Cho investigates propagation of failures 
and cascading failures. The chapter by Giacomello and Pescaroli discusses cascading failures 
and the role of human factors in propagation of failure. 
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Provide Buffering: In data and commodity flow networks, the function of the network is to 
offer its clients access to a set of delivered items. In such networks, buffers (e.g., caching, local 
storage) constitute a resiliency mechanism that obviates the need for continued access to the 
original source. Should the original source become unreachable, one can switch to a local 
supplier. Hence, local access can be ensured despite interruption of the global supply network 
as long as access to a local cache (buffer) is available. Local access is an especially valuable 
solution in the case of a data flow network, where the commodity (namely, the data content) is 
not consumed by user access, in the sense that a local distributer can continue to serve a 
content item to new users irrespective of its use by others. Much work on network buffering 
has been done to increase the resiliency of data access to fluctuations in resource availability. 
For example, buffering (or caching) has been used to restore connectivity and performance 
upon topology changes in ad hoc networks, as well as to reduce access latency in disruption-
tolerant network. 
Prepare Active Agents: Active agents – human or artificial -- should be available to take active 
measures in order to absorb, recover and adapt. In order to be effective in doing so, the agents 
must have plans, processes and preparation. Where appropriate and necessary, human 
operators or users of the system should play the role of active resilience agents. Wherever 
possible, however, the designer of the system should consider introducing into the system a set 
of artificial partly-autonomous intelligent agents that are able to conduct the absorption and 
recovery actions, in an autonomous manner (Kott et al 2018).  
In order to perform the absorb and recover actions in presence of the adversary malware 
deployed on the friendly system, the artificial agent often has to take destructive actions, such 
as deleting or quarantining certain software. Such destructive actions are carefully controlled 
by the appropriate rules of engagement. Developers of the agent should attempt to design its 
actions and planning capability to minimize the associated risk. This risk has to be balanced 
against the destruction caused by the adversary if the agent’s action is not taken. Because the 
adversary and its malware know that the agent exists and is likely to be present on the system, 
the malware seeks to find and destroy the agent. Therefore, the agent possesses techniques 
and mechanisms for maintaining a degree of stealth, camouflage and concealment. More 
generally, the agent takes measures that reduce the probability that the malware will detect 
the agent. The agent is mindful of the need to exercise self-preservation and self-defense. 
When humans are the active resilience agents, in order to be effective these human agents 
must be appropriately trained, prepared, motivated. They should have skills, resources and 
processes available to them, to perform the functions of absorb, recover and adapt. The human 
organization should be properly structured, roles and responsibilities clearly defined, collective 
skills developed, and team training and rehearsals conducted.  
In this book, a number of chapter focus on various related aspects. The chapter by Key et al 
discusses organizational measures and human resources practices.  The chapter by Bodeau and 
Graubart mention non-persistence, realignment, and adaptive responses. The chapter by Evans 
talks about active measures including MTD and Cyber Deception. The chapter by Giacomello 
and Pescaroli explores human factors and organizational culture. And the chapter by Tandiya et 
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al presents and compares AI techniques that might be considerate for implementing response 
strategies. 
Build Agents Capabilities: Ideally, agents should be able to perform one of multiple functions 
depending on context, and the same function could be performed by one of several agents. For 
example, storage agents (buffers, caches) in a network can use their space to store any of a set 
of possible items. Also, the same item can be stored by any of multiple agents. For example, 
individuals in an organization can allocate their time to any of a set of possible projects. 
Similarly, the same project can be performed by any of multiple individuals. The combination of 
versatility and redundancy of agents significantly improves resiliency of network functions by 
facilitating reconfiguration to adapt to perturbations. Intuitively, the higher the versatility of the 
individual agents and the higher the degree to which they are interchangeable, the more 
resilient is the system to perturbation because it can reallocate functions to agents more 
flexibly to restore its performance upon resource loss. Another useful dimension is agent’s 
capacity; that is, the number of different functions that an agent can simultaneously perform. 
Capacity quantifies, for example, the number of items a storage node can simultaneously hold, 
or the number of projects a given individual can simultaneously work on. On a related note, in 
this book, Curado et al describe a distributed decision mechanism supported by multiple SDN 
controllers intended to enhance recovery mechanisms. 
Consider Adversary: If the adversary specifically tailors his techniques and procedures – and 
possesses the necessary capabilities – in order to defeat specifically the absorption and 
recovery efforts, the systems resilience will suffer accordingly. The designer of the system 
should consider the likely adversary’s capabilities, intent, tactics, techniques and procedures, 
and design the mechanisms and processes of absorption and recovery in a manner that are 
more likely to withstand the adversary actions. Game-theoretic analysis and wargaming – 
manual or computerized – should be conducted in order to optimize the proposed measures 
(Colbert et al 2017). In this book, the chapter by Kotenko et al considers explicit modeling of 
adversaries attack methods. The chapter by Bodeau and Graubart discusses how resilience-
enhancing measures may need to be adapted in case of an adversary that constitutes an 
Advanced Persistent Threats. 
Conduct Analysis: As noted in several places in this section, all resilience-enhancing measures 
and actin can also cause un-anticipated effects leading to overall reduction in resilience. 
Therefore, rigorous, high-fidelity analysis is a must. A resilience-enhancing measure should not 
be designed or introduced without an appropriate analysis that is capable of revealing potential 
negative impacts and systemic effects (Kott et al 2017). Comparative analytical studies should 
be conducted with and without the proposed measure. High-fidelity, simulation-based analysis 
is particularly appropriate. The fidelity of the simulation should be sufficient to replicate 
multiple modes of propagation, modes of interactions, feedback channels, and second and 
third-order effects. Because adversary actions and counteractions play a great role in cyber 
resilience, the analysis must include the adversary as well.  In this book, the chapter by Musman 
offers recommendations for conducting analysis that leads to estimating a mission resilience 
metrics.  The chapter by Ormrod and Turnbull reviews topics related to simulation of complex 
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systems for analysis of resilience. The chapter by Rose et al addresses economic aspects in 
comparative analysis of different resilience-enhancing techniques. The chapter by Karsai et al 
describes an example of a toolkit for simulation-based resilience analysis. 
 
 
Preview of the Book 
 
Reflecting the key themes we have covered in the introduction, the first three parts of the book 
cover the topics of quantification, assessment and analysis, and enhancement of cyber 
resilience. The fourth, final, part is dedicated to cases studies of selected classes of systems and 
networks.   
The first part presents two alternative – but not incompatible – views on how to quantify cyber 
resilience via suitable metrics. It opens with a chapter by Cybenko that takes the perspective in 
which system performance is central to the metrics. As discussed in the Introduction chapter of 
this book, cyber resiliency has become an increasingly important, relevant and timely research 
and operational concept in cyber security. Although multiple metrics have been proposed for 
quantifying cyber resiliency, a connection remains to be made between those metrics and 
operationally measurable and meaningful resilience concepts that can be empirically 
determined in an objective manner. This chapter describes a concrete quantitative notion of 
cyber resiliency that can be tailored to meet specific needs of organizations seeking to 
introduce resiliency into their assessment of their cyber security posture. 
If the previous chapter showed how to quantify cyber resilience from the perspective of system 
performance, the chapter by Musman et al takes an alternative view – the perspective of 
mission risk. The chapter describes the features that any definition of resilience should consider 
to enable measurable assessment and comparison. It proposes a definition of resilience that 
supports those considerations. Then, it reviews and discusses in detail the terminology and 
definitions that have been proposed in the context of these considerations. Ultimately, the 
chapter chooses a definition of resilience that relates to “mission risk.” When based on risk, the 
authors of this chapter argue, a resilience definition is clearly defined, measurable, and has a 
sound theoretical grounding. Since risk relies on both the likelihood of events occurring as well 
as changes in value (i.e., damage) when these events occur, we are provided with a computable 
metric that enables assessment and comparison. This allows us to tailor metrics to specific 
systems. 
The second part of the book focuses on approaches to assessment and analysis of cyber 
resilience. Having discussed, in the previous two chapters, perspectives on quantifying cyber 
resilience, we now present several chapters that assemble qualitative and quantitative inputs 
for a broad range of metrics that might apply to cyber resilience. Some of these approaches 
(e.g., most of this chapter and the next one) are largely qualitative and based on human review 
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and judgement of pertinent aspects of systems, organization and processes. Other are based on 
quantitative and often theoretically rigorous modeling and simulation of systems, networks and 
processes.  
The purpose of the chapter by Keys and Shapiro is to outline best practices in an array of areas 
related to cyber resilience.  While by no means offering an exhaustive list of best practices, the 
chapter provides an organization with means to “see what works” at other organizations.  It 
offers these best practices within existing frameworks related to dimensions of cyber resilience. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of several existing frameworks and guidelines that can be 
utilized to think about cyber resilience. Then, the chapter describes a set of “best practices” 
based on a selection of metrics from these frameworks. These best practices can help an 
organization as a guide to implementing specific policies that would improve their cyber 
resilience. 
The general overview of frameworks and best practices of cyber resilience assessments 
provided in the previous chapter is followed by the chapter by Evans and Horsthemke that 
focuses more specifically on methodologies that use the concept of cyber dependencies. A 
cyber dependency is a connection between two components, such that these components’ 
functions depend on one another and loss of any one of them degrades the performance of the 
system as a whole. Such dependencies must be identified and understood as part of a cyber 
resilience assessment. This chapter describes two related methodologies that help identify and 
quantify the impact of the loss of cyber dependencies.  One relies on a facilitated survey and 
dependency curve analysis, and helps an organization understand its resiliency to the loss of a 
dependency. That methodology incorporates the ability of an organization to withstand a loss 
through backup (recovery) methods and assess its resiliency over time. Another methodology 
helps an organization consider the indirect dependencies that can cause cascading failures if 
not sufficiently addressed through protective measures. However, that methodology does not 
incorporate protective measures such as redundancy or consider the possibility that the loss of 
a dependency might not have an immediate impact. 
Unlike the previous chapter where propagation of failures along the dependency links was 
studied in a qualitative, human-judgement fashion, the chapter by Moore and Cho offers an 
approach to analyzing resilience to failure propagation via a rigorous use of percolation theory. 
In percolation theory, the basic idea is that a node failure or an edge failure (reverse) percolates 
throughout a network and, accordingly, the failure affects the connectivity among nodes. The 
degree of network resilience can be measured by the size of a largest component (or cluster) 
after a fraction of nodes or edges are removed in the network. In many cybersecurity 
applications, the underlying ideas of percolation theory have not been much explored. In this 
chapter, it is explained how percolation theory can be used to measure network resilience in 
the process of dealing with different types of network failures. It introduces the measurement 
of adaptability and recoverability in addition to that of fault-tolerance as new contributions to 
measuring network resilience by applying percolation theory. 
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The chapter by Kotenko and co-workers continues exploring how resilient is a network to a 
failure propagating through it; however, now we also include an explicit treatment of specific 
causes of failure – malicious activities of the cyber attacker. This chapter considers cyber-
attacks and the ability to counteract their implementation as the key factors determining the 
resilience of computer networks and systems. Indeed, cyber-attacks are the most important 
among destabilizing forces impacting a network. Moreover, the term cyber resilience can be 
interpreted as the stability of computer networks or systems operating under impact of cyber-
attacks. The approach in this chapter involves the construction of analytical models to 
implement the most well-known types of attacks. The result of the modeling is the distribution 
function of time and average time of implementation of cyber-attacks. These estimates are 
then used to find the indicators of cyber resilience. To construct analytical models of cyber-
attacks, this chapter introduces an approach based on the stochastic networks conversion, 
which works well for modeling multi-stage stochastic processes of different nature. 
So far, the discussion was limited to relatively narrow abstractions of systems and networks. 
Such narrow abstractions allow effective assessment and analysis methodologies, but do not 
cover the richness and diversity of realistic organizations, systems and processes. Therefore, 
the chapter by Ormrod and Turnbull explains how to build a multi-dimensional simulation 
model an organization’s business processes. This multi-dimensional view incorporates physical 
objects, human factors, and time and cyberspace aspects. Not all systems, the components 
within a system, or the connections and interfaces between systems and domains are equally 
resilient to attack. It is important to test complex systems under load in a variety of 
circumstances to both understand the risks inherent in the systems, but also to test the 
effectiveness of redundant and degenerate systems. There is a growing need to test and 
compare the limitations and consequences of potential mitigation strategies before 
implementation. Simulation is a valuable tool because it can explore and demonstrate 
relationships between environmental variables in a controlled and repeatable manner. This 
chapter introduces the Integrated Cyber-Physical Effects (ICPE) model as a means of describing 
the synergistic results obtained through the simultaneous, parallel or sequential prosecution of 
attacking and defensive measures in both the physical and cyber domains. 
Suppose you assessed or analyzed the resilience of a system using approaches described in Part 
2 of this book, or similar approaches. Chances are, you determined that the resilience of the 
system is inadequate, at least in part. Would should you do to improve it? This is the theme of 
Part 3 of this book: methods, techniques and approaches to enhancing cyber resilience of a 
system, either via an appropriate initial design, or by adding mitigation measures, or by 
defensive actions during a cyber-attack.  
The chapter by Bodeau and Graubart opens the theme with a broad overview of approaches to 
enhancing systems resilience in the spirit of Systems Engineering. It starts by providing 
background on the state of the practice for cyber resilience. Next, the chapter describes how a 
growing set of frameworks, analytic methods, and technologies can be used to improve system 
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and mission cyber resilience. For example, technologies and processes created for contingency 
planning and COOP can be adapted to address advanced cyber threats. These include Diversity 
and Redundancy. Cybersecurity technologies and best practices can be extended to consider 
advanced cyber threats. These include Analytic Monitoring, Coordinated Defense, Privilege 
Restriction, Segmentation, and Substantiated Integrity. 
In the previous chapter, we were introduced to active defense among numerous other 
approaches. Now, in the chapter by Evans, we explore active defense techniques in detail. 
These are automated and human-directed activities that attempt to thwart cyber-attacks by 
increasing the diversity, complexity, or variability of the systems and networks. These limit the 
attacker's ability to gather intelligence, or reduces the usable lifespan of the intelligence. Other 
approaches focus on gathering intelligence on the attackers, either by attracting attackers to 
instrumented honeypots or by patrolling the systems and networks to hunt for attackers. The 
intelligence gathering approaches rely upon cyber security personnel using semi-automated 
techniques to respond and repel attackers. Widely available commercial solutions for active 
defense so far are lacking. Although general purpose products may emerge, meanwhile 
organizations need to tailor their applications for available solutions, or develop their own 
customized active defense. A successfully architected system or application should include 
passive defenses, which add protection without requiring human interaction, as well as active 
defenses. 
Technology solutions have been our focus so far. Now, the chapter by Giacomello and Pescaroli 
notes the possibility that the human component of critical infrastructures, instead of the mere 
technological one, could be the primary vector of events constituting less than resilient 
behavior of a system. This chapter introduces a systemic approach that contextualizes 
cascading dynamics in the vulnerability of their technological as well as human assets. It is 
followed by a wider focus on the evolution of critical infrastructure and management, 
envisioned as root causes of cascades, introducing the role of the human factor in that process. 
The chapter highlight why any investment in technological resilience of cyber assets cannot be 
missing the integration of its human component, defining practical suggestions for the field. In 
fact, there is a growing consensus among security experts is that the weakest link in the 
security chain is the human being, whether as users, customers, administrators or managers. 
The technological progress needs to be followed step by step by improvement in operator’s 
skills and routines, adjusting their improvisational behaviors and resilience. 
The next chapter, by Linkov and co-workers, continues the topic we started to discuss in the 
previous chapter – the human factors. However, it focuses on a specific method of enhancing 
cyber resilience via establishing appropriate rules for employees of an organization under 
consideration. Such rules aim at reducing threats from, for example, current or former 
employees, contractors, and business partners who intentionally use their authorized access to 
an organization to harm the organization. System users can also unintentionally contribute to 
cyber-attacks, or themselves become a passive target of a cyber-attack. The implementation of 
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work-related rules is intended to decrease such risks. However, rules implementation can also 
increase the risks that arise from employee disregard for rules. This can occur when the rules 
become too restrictive, and employees become more likely to disregard the rules. Furthermore, 
the more often employees disregard the rules both intentionally and unintentionally, the more 
likely insider threats are able to observe and mimic employee behavior. This chapter shows 
how to find an intermediate, optimal collection of rules between the two extremes of ‘too 
many rules’ and ‘not enough rules’. 
Recent years have seen continuous, rapid growth in popularity and capabilities of Artificial 
Intelligence, and broader speaking, of other computational techniques inspired by biological 
analogies. It is most appropriate, therefore, for this book to explore how such techniques might 
contribute to enhancing cyber resilience.  The chapter by Tandiya and co-workers argues that 
the fast-paced development of new cyber-related technologies complicates the classical 
approach of designing problem-specific algorithms for cyber resilience. Instead, “general-
purpose" algorithms – such as biologically-inspired artificial Intelligence (BIAI) -- are more 
suited for such problems. BIAI techniques allow learning, adaptability, and robustness, which 
are compatible with cyber resilience scenarios like self-organization, dynamic operation 
conditions, and performance in adversarial environment. The chapter introduces the readers to 
BIAI techniques and describes various BIAI techniques and their taxonomy. It also proposes 
metrics which can be used to compare the techniques in terms of their performance, 
implementation ease, and requirements. Finally, the chapter illustrates the potential of such 
techniques via several case studies -- applications pertaining to wireless communication 
systems. 
Implementation of means for enhancing cyber resilience – any of the means we have discussed 
in the preceding chapters -- costs money. Is this a worthwhile investment? The chapter by Rose 
and co-workers provides economic perspective on how to choose the most economically-
appropriate approaches to improving cyber resilience. These considerations are rather 
complex. For example, property damage, except for destruction of data, has thus far been a 
relatively minor cost of cyber threats, in contrast to instances of significant loss of functionality 
of a cyber system itself or the system it helps operate.  The latter translates into loss of output 
(sales revenue and profits) and loss of employment, and is often referred to as business 
interruption (BI).  Thus, post-disaster strategies that enable a system to rebound more 
efficiently and quickly hold the prospects of greatly reducing BI. Moreover, there are numerous 
resilience tactics on both the cyber service provider side and customer side, many of which are 
relatively inexpensive. The latter include back-up data storage and equipment, substitutes for 
standard cyber components, conserving on cyber needs, and recapturing lost production once 
the cyber capability is restored.  The chapter describes the analysis based on basic principles of 
economics and is couched in a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) framework as an aid to decision-
making.  The chapter goes beyond the conceptual level and offers estimates of the costs and 
effectiveness of various mitigation and resilience tactics. 
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The chapter by Evans and Horsthemke opens the last, fourth, part of our book. In this part we 
explore several cases where cyber resilience was addressed – from different perspectives – in 
application to complex systems or networks. We collected these cases to answer the question 
of a practically-minded reader, “How do I approach assessing of enhancing resilience of a 
particular system I am interested in?” While these few cases cannot cover all possible classes of 
systems or networks, they serve as useful illustrative examples and could inform approaches to 
resilience in other classes of systems.  
The opening chapter of this part discusses large-scale, highly complex web of systems called 
regional critical infrastructure. These are responsible for providing entire large regions (the size 
of states or countries) with water, electricity, natural gas, communications, transportation, 
healthcare, police, fire protection, and ambulances. Often, these are further complicated by 
multiple, not always fully cooperative owners of these systems; and by the diversity of threats 
that may attacks such systems, ranging from natural disasters to state-sponsored cyber 
attackers. The chapter focuses mainly on particular cyber resiliency assessment (CRA) 
methodology. The foundation of the methodology are collective assessments by human 
stakeholders and experts, seeking areas of concerns and developing options for resilience 
enhancements. CRA involves analytical and modeling techniques for cyber assessments. The 
chapter illustrates the application of CRA to a regional critical infrastructure with a realistic case 
study.   
Then Curado and co-workers address cyber-physical systems resilience with a focus on Internet 
of Things (IoT) as a particularly prominent example of large-scale cyber-physical systems. The 
emphasis is on current and future network architectures and systems, highlighting main 
research issues and technological trends. The chapter opens by discussing and contrasting 
resilience of organization and resilience of communications and computing technologies. It 
then proceeds to explore issues of resilience in two use cases. One case deals with smart cities 
(arguably a form of IoT) and another with large scale networks. The chapter points out that the 
Internet of Things is evolving towards an Internet of Everything, where everybody and 
everything are connected to provide multiple services within various contexts such as Smart 
Home, Wearables, Smart City, Smart Grid, Industrial Internet, Connected Car, Connected 
Health, Smart Retail, Smart Supply Chain and Smart Farming. In the context of this evolution, a 
number of challenges must be addressed, most of which touch on issues of resilience, among 
others. 
Pacheco and co-workers continue the discussion of cyber-physical systems, including Internet 
of Things, with a special focus on resilient services for Smart Cities. The topic of Smart Cities has 
been already introduced in the previous chapter, and now, this chapter presents a detailed 
approach to design and development of resilient services for Smart Cities based on Moving 
Target Defense (MTD) and autonomic computing paradigms. Moving Target Defense is often 
seen as a game changing approach to building self-defending systems. In an earlier chapter 
“Active Defense Techniques” MTD has been introduced in a broader context. In the specific 
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instantiation of MTD in this chapter, it dynamically randomizes the resources used, and the 
execution environment to run CPS applications, so that the attackers (outsiders or insiders) 
cannot determine the resources used to run the provided services and consequently are unable 
to evade attacks. The chapter discusses both the detailed methodology for applying MTD to 
enhance resilience of Smart, and the experimental results obtained with implemented 
prototypes.   
A transportation network is a critical component of a Smart City (considered in the preceding 
chapter), and therefore it is fitting that a distinguishing element of the next chapter, by Karsai 
and co-workers, is the resilience analysis of transportation networks. The chapter highlights the 
importance of humans in most cyber-physical systems and uses the term Human Cyber Physical 
System (H-CPS). It further argues that H-CPS design processes should use five fundamentally 
different abstraction layers: the Physical Layer, the three “cyber” layers: Network, Service 
Platform and Application Layers, and the Human Layer. It them describes describe the Cyber-
Physical Systems Wind Tunnel (CPSWT), a simulation integration architecture and tool kit, and 
proceeds to illustrate a simulation-based resilience analysis using a transportation network 
example. 
Supply chains are among the most exposed and vulnerable component of any system. The last 
chapter of the book, by Collier and co-workers, explores the resilience perspective of supply 
chain and begins by identifying a set of factors that enable resilience. It also explains the nature 
of actors within the supply chain and discusses possible metrics for characterizing cyber 
resilience of supply chains, as well as of broader systems in which a supply chain is a 
component. To a large extent, this chapter – and in fact the entire book -- is a review of 
proposed research agenda on many topics that are yet to be addressed in our quest to 
understand the ways of quantifying, analyzing and enhancing the cyber resilience.   
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